Introduction 27
The enactive view of perception -implied by active vision and inference -suggests 28 an intimate co-dependency between perception and the active sampling of our sensorium. 29
In this work, we take the embodied view to its ultimate conclusion and consider perception 30 as a function of the physical and physiological body we use to 'measure' the world. In 31 particular, our focus is on the coupling -or interaction -between interoceptive and 32 exteroceptive perception; namely, how bodily states and states of affairs beyond the body 33 are inferred -and how inference about each domain affects the other. quality of sensory evidence that depend upon when we actually interrogate the world, in 58 relation to the biorhythms of our sensory apparatus; namely, our body.neuronal and behavioral responses associated with inferential processes can be simulated 91 on a trial by trial basis. This means that we can use electrophysiological, eye tracking, 92 pupillometry and other physiological proxies to test various hypotheses that can be 93 instantiated in the model. Crucially, this provides a link between neuronal and behavioural 94 responses -as characterised by the latency between stimuli onset and autonomic responses 95 (e.g., heart rate acceleration or variability) or confidence judgements (i.e., responses to how 96 confident were you in your perceptual judgement?). In this paper, we will focus on the basic 97 phenomenology and (some counterintuitive) results. In subsequent work, we will use this 98 formalism to model real responses under various experimental manipulations. 99
In what follows, we briefly describe the generative model and inversion scheme used 100 to simulate cardiac arousal responses. We then demonstrate the results of anatomical 101 (deafferentation) lesions on perceptual and metacognitive behaviour, as well as simulated 102 belief updating. Finally, we will examine the effects on synthetic heart-rate variability when 103 changing the precision of various prior beliefs that underlie perceptual inference. We 104 conclude with a discussion of the implications for existing research in this area -and how 105 this research could be informed by a formal approach providing guidelines to discovery. 106 107 108
Methods 109 110

Markov Decision Process 111 112
The simulations reported below build upon the notion of active inference. This is a 'first-113 principles' approach to understanding (Bayes) optimal behaviour. Simply put, active 114 inference treats the brain as using an internal (generative) model of the world to explain 115 exteroceptive, proprioceptive, and interoceptive sensory data. By optimizing beliefs about 116 variables in this model (perceptual inference), or by changing their internal or externalenvironment (action), creatures can ensure their sensations and prior beliefs are consistent 1 . 118 A Markov decision process (MDP) is a form of probabilistic generative model that describes 119 the sequential dynamics of unobserved (hidden) variables (e.g., the current state of the 120 cardiac cycle) and the sensations they cause (e.g., baroreceptor signals). The hidden 121 variables of an MDP are hidden states (sτ) and sequences of actions or policies (π). The 122 generative model then embodies the conditional dependencies between these variables, as 123 expressed graphically in Figure 1 . While we provide a brief overview here, we refer readers 124 to (Friston et al., 2017a) hypothesis about 'how I am going to behave'. These are evaluated in terms of prior beliefs 138 (E), and the (predicted) evidence future data affords (G). Just as free energy is used to 139 approximate the evidence data affords a hypothesis, expected free energy evaluates the 140 expected evidence, under beliefs about how data are actively generated. As expressed in 141 Using the MDP scheme detailed above, we set out to simulate a cardiac arousal 161 response to threatening stimuli (e.g., a vicious looking spider), in comparison to non-162 arousing stimuli (e.g., some flowers). To do this, we had to define 'arousal' and its 163 interoceptive correlates. To keep things as simple as possible, we assumed the subject's 164 generative model included two sorts of hidden states (interoceptive and exteroceptive -andthat she could adopt two modes of engagement with the world (relaxed and aroused). These 166 sorts of generative models are generally cast as Markov decision processes, whereby 167 transitions among (hidden) states generate observable outcomes in one or more modalities. 168
The modalities considered here were exteroceptive (non-arousing versus arousing visual 169 stimuli) and interoceptive (the cardiac phase; diastolic or systolic). Having defined the nature 170 of the state space generating outcomes, this model can then be parameterised in a relatively 171 straightforward fashion as outlined above. For any set of A,B,C,D, and E parameters, one can 172 then simulate active inference using standard marginal message passing schemes (Parr et 173 al., 2019) to optimize expectations about hidden states of the world -and the action or policy 174 currently being pursued (technically, a policy is a sequence of actions. In what follows, we 175 only consider policies with one action) (Friston et al., 2017a (Friston et al., , 2017c . 176
Crucially, inference about policies rest upon prior beliefs that the policies will 177 minimise expected free energy in the future. This expected free energy has both epistemic 178 and instrumental terms; namely; the ability of any particular course of action to resolve 179 uncertainty about hidden states (known as salience, Bayesian surprise, information gain, This simple structure produced some remarkable results that speak to the intimate 222 relationship between interoception and exteroception. These phenomena (see below) rest 223 upon the final set of beliefs; namely, preferred outcomes. Here, the subject believed that she 224 would be, on average, in a systolic state when confronted with an arousing picture and in a 225 diastolic state otherwise. These minimal prior preferences then present the subject with an 226 interesting problem. She has to choose between extending periods of precise evidence 227 accumulation (i.e., a relaxed state with more diastolic episodes) and sacrificing precise 228 information, via cardio-acceleration, should she infer there is something arousing 'out there'. 229
However, to infer what is 'out there', she has to resolve her uncertainty, through epistemic 230 foraging; i.e., maintaining a relaxed state. We therefore hypothesised that at the beginning ofeach trial or exposure to a picture 2 , subjects would be preferentially in a relaxed state until 232 they had accumulated sufficient evidence to confidently infer the visual object was arousing 233 or not. If arousing, she would then infer herself to be aroused and enter into a period of 234 cardio-acceleration (illustrated in Figure 3) . 235
By carefully adjusting the precision of sensory evidence (through adjusting the A 236 matrix), we could trade-off the evidence accumulation against these imperatives to simulate 237 the elaboration of an arousing response to, and only to, arousing stimuli. Furthermore, we 238 anticipated that a failure to implement a selected policy of arousal would both confound 239 inference about the policy being pursued (i.e., an aroused state of mind) and -importantly - under a canonical volatility of ζ = 0.9. In other words, we will assume that our synthetic 263 subject believes state transitions among phases of the cardiac cycle follow each other fairly 264 reliably with a 90% probability. Similarly, if there is a flower 'out there', then there is a 90% 265 probability that it will remain there at the next sample. Cardiac and visual stimuli were 266 generated by the same precisions and volatilities as assumed by the subject's generative 267
model. 268
We conducted three sets of simulations to illustrate the sorts of behaviours that 269 In the first set of simulations (Fig. 3) , we focused on the physiological and psychological 293 response to arousing stimuli. To do so, we tested the hypothesis that the unexpected 294 presentation of a 'spider' would induce an aroused state -as reflected in an increased heart 295 rate -and a greater posterior expectation of encountering an arousing spider stimulus on 296 the next trial. To evaluate this hypothesis, we supplied the subject with a fixed sequence of 297 15 stimuli -in both the cardiac and visual domains -and examined the posterior beliefs 298 about the next exteroceptive state following a period of relaxed cardiac input. Note that this 299 is possible precisely because our generative model includes beliefs about the future -300 including the next hidden state and subsequent sensory sample. Here, we used as outcome 301 measures the agent's evoked cardiac acceleration response (calculated by binning the 302 number of siastole events across the experiment) and the agent's posterior belief that the 303 next stimulus would be threatening. These simulations were repeated 60 times with 304 randomized starting values, such that the first thirty 'healthy' agents where compared to an 305 'interoceptive lesion' group for whom interoceptive precision had been attenuated (β = 0.5). 306
This enabled us to not only establish the interaction of fear expectations and cardiac arousal, 307 but also to demonstrate how these responses change when interoceptive sensory precision 308 is ablated. 309
In the second set of simulations (Fig. 4) , our focus moved from perceptual to 310 metacognitive inference. Here, we examined the interaction between exteroceptive and 311 interoceptive sensory precision on the one hand and their coupling to cardiac timing and 312 metacognition (posterior confidence) on the other. Our goal here was to illustrate how bothinteroceptive and exteroceptive precision interact to influence metacognitive inference, and 314 to link these to empirical findings showing that cardiac arousal biases metacognition (Allen 315 et al., 2016b; Hauser et al., 2017a). For these, we used the uncertainty about inferred 316 exteroceptive and interoceptive states (as quantified by the summed entropy of posterior 317 beliefs for each state) as outcome measures, simulated under a range of cardiac and visual 318 precision settings (figure 3A). To further illustrate how these effects oscillate with the 319 cardiac rhythm, we separated these measures for each phase of the cardiac cycle (early 320 diastole, late diastole, systole). We then repeated these analyses comparing 'healthy' 321 interoceptive inference agents (α & β = 0.9), to agents for whom either exteroceptive or 322 interoceptive precision was lesioned (α or β = 0.5, respectively). In virtue of our coupling of 323 exteroceptive sensory precision to the cardiac cycle, we anticipated that metacognitive 324 confidence (outscored by the negative entropy of posterior beliefs) would depend on the 325 precision of both interoceptive and exteroceptive states, and that this effect would clearly 326 oscillate with the cardiac cycle. Further, we expected in the extreme case of our 'lesioned' 327 subjects, these effects would be further exacerbated such that interoceptive and 328 exteroceptive uncertainty would increase dramatically, under their respective lesion 329 conditions. 330 332 statistics of the physiological responses to changes in sensory precision. These were based 352 upon simulated heart rate (frequency of systole) and the heart rate variability (HRV) 353 assessed over multiple trials or heartbeats (Fig. 5) . Our objectives here were; 1) to test the 354 hypothesis that fluctuations in both low-and high-frequency synthetic heart rate variability 355 can be produced by altering the balance of interoceptive sensory precision versus the prior 356 precision for the aroused sympathetic policy, and 2) to illustrate how generative modelling 357 of interoceptive active inference can be used to phenotype maladaptive inference 358 parameters from observed heart-rate data (i.e., interoceptive inference phenotyping). For 359 this analysis, we simulated 1000 trials under three canonical parameter settings designed to 360 resemble potential neuropsychiatric phenotypes of interest: healthy interoception (α = 0.8, 361 β = 0.8, prior probability of parasympathetic policy = 55%), hyper-precise interoceptive 362 sensation (α = 0.8, β = 1, prior probability of parasympathetic policy = 55%), and hyper-363 precise arousal priors (α = 0.8, β = 0.8, prior probability of sympathetic policy = 75%). 364
The resulting time-series of systole events from each agent were then convolved with 365 a canonical QRS-wave response function and transformed into normalized beat-to-beat RR-366 intervals. To normalize the (arbitrary) sampling rate of each time-series, we assigned a 367 350ms repetition time (TR) for each state of the MDP simulation, such that the healthy agent 368 had a heart rate of approximately 60 BPM. The time intervals between successive synthetic 369 R-peaks was then calculated. As the RR interval data is unevenly sampled, the time series 370 was linearly interpolated. The power spectrum was then estimated using Welch's method. 371
In line with conventional HRV analysis, the power spectra were then categorized into four 372 frequency bands corresponding to ultra-low (0 -0. another with hyper-precise priors for the aroused (sympathetic) policy (bottom right). These each produce 395 unique interoceptive inference 'fingerprints'; i.e., the individual patterns of heart-rate variability produced by 396 these parameter settings. In this example, hyper-precise visceral sensations reduce heart-rate and shift overall 397 peak frequency to the high-frequency domain, whereas hyper strong arousal priors induce strong heart-rate acceleration coupled with attenuated ultra-low and ultra-fast oscillations. In the future, these idiosyncratic 399 patterns could be used to identify maladaptive interoceptive inference from heart-rate data. heart-rate acceleration, following the presentation of the unexpected or novel threat 417 stimulus. During subsequent experiences of its own heartbeat and spiders or flowers, this 418 response habituates, resulting in a gradual heart-rate deceleration from the evoked cardiac 419 response. This robust modulation of heart-rate was accompanied by a jump from an 420 expected probability of encountering a spider of about 25% to almost 65% following the 421 spider presentation. This combined response of both the heartbeat and fear-expectations is 422 further underscored by the curious oscillation of cardiac states and the expected probability suggesting that the disruption of interoceptive precision may be one mechanism underlying
Simulating the Influence of Sensory Precision on Metacognition 456
We next performed a series of simulations to tease apart how interoceptive and 457 exteroceptive precision (and their disruption) influence 'metacognition'; that is the 458 uncertainty in our agent's beliefs. To do so, we first measured the Shannon entropy for 459 interoceptive and exteroceptive inferences (summed across both factors of posterior beliefs) 460 under a full range of precision settings from 0.5 -1. To highlight the oscillatory nature of 461 cardiac effects, we then calculated the same entropy measure separately for each cardiac 462 state (early diastole, late diastole, systole). Finally, we compared these 'healthy' simulations 463 to extreme degradations in sensory precision (exteroceptive and interoceptive 'lesions'), to 464 better understand how disruptions of each modality are integrated in metacognition. 465
This analysis revealed first of all that, in our simplified model, metacognitive 466 uncertainty is largely influenced by the unimodal precision of each domain. For both 467 exteroceptive and interoceptive inferences, the slope of the uncertainty gradient (Fig. 4A &  468 C) was predominantly characterized by degradations in the precision of the corresponding 469 modality. However, this modularity is not complete; exteroceptive uncertainty is at its lowest 470 when interoceptive and exteroceptive precision are maximal. Similarly, although 471 interoceptive uncertainty is largely driven by interoceptive precision, small interactions 472 with exteroceptive precision can be observed in the plotted uncertainty gradient. One 473 interesting isomorphism, however, is that overall interoceptive uncertainty is less affected 474 by exteroceptive precision. This is likely due to that fact that in our model, the cardiac cycle 475 directly modulates exteroceptive precision, whereas exteroceptive states only indirectly 476 modulate interoceptive responses, via policy selection. 477
This intricate relationship of the cardiac cycle and metacognitive uncertainty is 478 further teased apart in Figure 4B , which shows clearly that exteroceptive confidence 479 oscillates with each phase of the heartbeat, being highest at diastole. This is an unsurprising 480 feature of our model: on each diastole, phase exteroceptive sensory precision drops 481 effectively to null. Interestingly however, average exteroceptive uncertainty is modulated in 482 a fairly linear fashion by visceral and exteroceptive lesions: average entropy is increased 483 modestly by lesioning interoceptive precision and more robustly by exteroceptive lesions. 484
Whereas interoceptive lesions caused the greatest increase in interoceptive entropy,exteroceptive lesions seem to exert a specific effect of unbinding entropy from the individual 486 cardiac state, again mirroring the isomorphic representation of these states in uncertainty. 487 This is a sensible finding, as the manipulation leads to relatively high uncertainty in the 488 mapping between hidden states and outcomes during all cardiac phases, not just during the 489 previously attenuated systolic phase. This sort of chronic hypo-arousal -as a consequence 490 of a failure to contextually modulate precision -is not unlike that which may underwrite the 491 negative symptoms of schizophrenia or depression. 492
Synthetic Heart-Rate Variability (HRV) and Embodied Computational Phenotyping 493
In our final set of simulations, we illustrated how the interoceptive inference approach 494 developed here offers a new means for analyzing and interpreting fluctuations in observed 495 physiological data. Our goal here was to demonstrate the potential for generative modelling 496 and 'embodied computational phenotyping'; i.e., the identification of specific parameters of 497 brain-body interaction underlying maladaptive interoceptive inference in psychiatric and 498 other health-harming disorders; e.g., (Peters et al., 2017) . 499
To this end, we generated synthetic cardiac data by convolving our train of cardiac 500 events with an ECG response waveform. Following standard methods, we then calculated the 501 normalized beat-to-beat intervals and performed a time-frequency analysis of the resulting 502 RR-interval data. By repeating this analysis for a 'healthy' agent under normative values, an 503 agent with interoceptive 'hyper-precision' (i.e., β = 1), and an agent with an overly precise 504 prior beliefs about its own arousal, we illustrate how individual HRV fingerprints are linked 505 to unique patterns of interoceptive active inference. 506
This analysis showed that, despite the exceedingly simple (biomechanically speaking) 507 conditions of our model, sensible and interesting patterns of heart-rate variability emerge 508 for different combinations of interoceptive sensory and prior precision. Specifically, we 509 found that whereas the healthy agent exhibited a relatively relaxed profile in terms of heart 510 rate and sympathovagal balance (BMP = 63.5, peak frequency = 0.14 Hz) -predominated by 511 low versus high frequency oscillations (aLF/aHF = 0.52) -an agent with hyper-precise 512 visceral sensations exhibited a mild downshift in heart-rate coupled (BPM= 59.5) with an 513 overall increase in high-frequency oscillations (aLF/aHF = 0.51, peak frequency = 0.25). Incontrast, the agent with hyper-precise arousal priors showed a strong bimodal modulation 515 of both ultra-low and ultra-high frequencies HRV (peak frequencies = 0.04 Hz & 0.34 Hz, 516 respectively), coupled with a strong increase in heart-rate (BPM = 84) and high versus low-517 frequency outflow (aLF/aHF = 0.47). These results speak to the unique role of different 518 active inference parameters in producing highly idiosyncratic patterns of HRV variability. In 519 the future, our model may be enhanced to subserve computational phenotyping of individual 520 differences and/or patient subgroups categorized by the balance of visceral precision and 521 arousal policy priors from raw HRV data alone. The form of the generative model and (neurobiological implausible) belief updating 537 used in this paper are generic: exactly the same scheme has been used to simulate a whole 538 range of processes, from neuroeconomic games to scene construction and attentional neglect 539 By focusing on the periodic nature of the cardiac cycle, and concomitant influences 565 on exteroceptive perception, our goal was to provide an initial proof-of-principle, illustrating 566 how visceral and exteroceptive signals may be combined under active inference. Our aim 567 was not to suggest that our model provides the ultimate view of interoceptive inference; 568 indeed, we view the present work as a starting point that can be taken forward in a variety 569 of research directions, some of which are outline below. 570
In this paper, we formalized the hypothesis that frequently reported effects of cardiac 571 timing on perception could arise as a function of periodic sensory attenuation -but the 572 reader should feel encouraged to test their own hypotheses within the openly available MDP 573 framework. Our intention here was also not to prioritize cardiac-brain interaction over e.g., 574 gastric or respiratory cycles, but instead to provide a toy example, to show how these 575 systems may be subjected to formal analyses. This was motivated by the large predominanceof research on cardiac-brain interaction; however, we do anticipate that the periodic 577 attenuation of sensory precision by visceral signals is likely to provide a general explanation 578 of brain-body interaction. 579
Neurophysiologically, the principal means by which cardiac signals influence the 580 central nervous system is through the afferent cardiac baroreceptors. These pressure-581 sensitive neurons, located primarily in the aorta and carotid artery, are triggered by the 582 systolic pressure wave generated when the heart contracts. Far from being restricted to 583 homeostatic function only, it was first reported (nearly a century ago) that afferent 584 baroreceptor outputs induce a general inhibitory effect on cortical processing (Bonvallet et 585 al., 1954; Bonvallet and Bloch, 1961; Koch, 1932) . These findings were later extended by 586 Lacey and Lacey (1978) who proposed the "neurovisceral afferent integration hypothesis", 587 positing that cardiac acceleration and deceleration serve to respectively disengage or engage 588
with an exteroceptive stimulus via cortical inhibition. 589
In parallel, the soviet psychologist Evgeny Sokolov proposed that novelty (but not 590 threat) evoked heart-rate deceleration was a core component of the 'orienting reflex' 591 (Sokolov, 1963) . By reducing overall cardiac output, this reflex served to limit the 592 contribution of cardiac signals to cortical noise boosting overall signal-to-noise ratio 3 . In 593 contrast, Sokolov theorized that the defensive startle reflex -in which an extremely strong 594 (e.g., the loud bang of a starting gun) or unexpectedly aversive (e.g., the sudden presentation 595 1977; Saxon, 1970; Velden and Juris, 1975) . 602
While these findings highlight the intricate relationship between cardiac timing and 603 exteroceptive psychophysics, so far a consistent pattern of findings (e.g., sensory signal 604 enhancement and/or inhibition) has failed to emerge (see Elliott, 1972 We offer a unique synthesis of these views, expressed in terms of interoceptive 615
inference. In our model, the cyclic influence of the heart on exteroception is exerted primarily 616 through the attenuation of sensory precision on each systolic contraction, which in turns 617 influences the selected (multimodal) arousal policy as determined by the agent's 618 preferences. The coupling of sensory attenuation to the cardiac cycle endorses the notion 619 that baroreceptors exert an inhibitory influence on the brain. Beyond this direct effect, our 620 model can also be understood in light of the well-known relationship between intrinsic noise 621 fluctuations in the brain and cardio-respiratory cycles (Birn, 2012; Karavaev et al., 2018) . 622
Physiological oscillations exert non-neuronal influences on spontaneous brain activity via a 623 variety of more or less direct causal influences; for example, at each heart beat visual input 624 to the retina is briefly attenuated by a pulsatile blood inflow. Similarly, with each cardio-625 respiratory cycle, fluctuations in cerebral pulsatile motion and blood pressure induce 626 neurons to spontaneously fire, shaping the 'infraslow' brain dynamics (Golanov et al., 1994 ; 627 Karavaev et al., 2018; Zanatta et al., 2013 ) that influence the overall global dynamics of 628 neural excitability and connectivity (Fox et al., , 2006 . Our 629 suggestion is that, insofar as the brain must model its own dynamic noise trajectories as a 630 function of active self-inference, non-neuronal sources of variability such as inscribed by 631 visceral rhythms must be incorporated within the brain's generative model of its own 632 percepts. Interoceptive fluctuations are thus an important influence over the precision ofexteroceptive sensory channels, and interoception is itself the means by which the brain 634 infers and controls its own pathway through these precision trajectories. The modelling 635 introduced here can thus be expanded beyond the cardiac domain to the more general 636 problem of modelling how spontaneous fluctuations in neurovisceral cycles (including 637 heart-rate variability) influence information processing and behavior. 638
What then, explains the lack of consistent results within the cardiac timing literature? 639
In contrast to the binary on/off hypotheses proposed by Lacey or Sokolov, our simulations 640 highlight the context-sensitive manner by which ascending visceral signals modulate the 641 precision of both interoceptive and exteroceptive inferences. For example, our simulation of 642 the startle response (illustrated in Fig. 3 ) clearly indicates that the functional impact of 643 cardio-ballistic responses is coupled to the agent's baseline prior expectations, as well as the 644 overall precision of active inference and policy selection. In this sense, whether a specific 645 cardiac response is likely to potentiate or inhibit a specific domain (e.g., fear) depends upon 646 the specific weighting of arousal policy priors, the precision of incoming exteroceptive and 647 interoceptive sensations, and the linkages thereof as determined by the task itself. In other 648 words, the specific balance of prior beliefs and sensory information, in a given cognitive or 649 affective domain, must be addressed before one can predict the exact directionality of an 650 interoceptive effect on perception, or vice versa. Here, we modelled the generation of arousal 651 policies as a function of hyper-parameters governing the preferred policy. In the future this 652 can be unpacked further by examining the divergence between prior and posterior beliefs 653 about these policies (e.g., through inferred epistemic value). Through Landauer's principle, 654 this divergence may be equated with the associated metabolic costs of computation and the 655 conceptual notion of interoceptive self-modelling (Kiverstein, 2018; Limanowski and 656 Blankenburg, 2013; Seth and Tsakiris, 2018). 657
658
The computational neuroanatomy of interoceptive inference 659
Having addressed the construct validity of our model, we now speculate as to some 660 likely neuronal substrates of the message passing implied by variational inference. 661
Interoceptive inference can be broken down into four core functional domains: basicsensory-motor control, conscious interoceptive (perceptual) awareness, metacognitive 663 monitoring, and hedonic (intrinsic) value. In our model, we focused primarily on the simplest 664 possible implementation of interoceptive inference, corresponding to the sensory-motor 665 domain (i.e., ascending and descending cardiac pathways) and their low-level interaction 666 with exteroceptive inference, via neuromodulatory gain control. Future work will benefit 667 from expanding upon our representation of uncertainty to include the computation of 668 epistemic and/or intrinsic value as proxies for these higher-order interoceptive systems 669 However, the AIC is more densely interconnected with the PIC whereas the ACC is more 734 closely related to uncertainty and decision-making. On this basis, we propose that whereas 735 the AIC integrates the visceral and exteroceptive states required for the regulation of arousal 736 policies, the ACC is likely to regulate the gain or precision of these interactions 4 . 737
What about metacognitive or reward-related interoceptive processes? Although here 738 we do not model these higher-order functions, the model can be expanded to include the 739 explicit representation of policy uncertainty and epistemic value as the mechanisms 740 underlying metacognitive self-inference; i.e., the integrative self-model that combines 741 exteroceptive and interoceptive predictions into a conscious schema (Allen and Tsakiris, 742 2019). In this case, we would expect that the VMPFC and DLPFC are likely to be engaged in 743 inferences about variables (e.g., those derived from expected free energy such as epistemic 744 and intrinsic value) that contextualize the inferences performed by the AIC and ACC over 745 longer timescales (Friston et al., , 2017a . 
